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The 2000 presidential election exposed a surprisingly high level of inaccuracy in the
tabulation of ballots. Di®erences between total ballots cast and votes counted were as high
as 19 percent in some counties in Florida, and these discrepancies were widely attributed
to the ballot formats, the handling of ballots, and machine operations.1 For those involved
in the administration of elections the recount was particularly troubling. Over the last 40
years the United States has introduced new technologies, especially punch card and optically
scanned ballots, to improve vote tabulations. The problems revealed in Florida suggested
that these newer technologies may not in fact represent an improvement over traditional
hand-counted paper ballots.
A number of important studies of the performance and accuracy of voting technologies
have sought to measure the error rate of vote tabulations. The main metric that emerges
from these evaluations uses \residual votes" { the discrepancy between total ballots cast and
votes cast for a particular o±ce, such as president or governor. The incidence of residual
votes should be unrelated to the type of technology used, and the di®erence in residual
votes across technologies measures the extent to errors in the casting or tabulation of votes
are attributable to speci¯c the technology. Similar jurisdictions using di®erent technologies
ought to have the same residual vote rate, on average. By this metric, hand-counted paper
ballots and optically scanned paper ballots have shown the better overall performance than
punch cards, lever machines, and electronic voting machines.2
We examine a second measure of accuracy { the agreement between initial counts and
recounts of ballots in contested elections. We term this the tabulation validation rate. Like-
wise, the discrepancy between the initial count and the recount is the tabulation error rate.
1The NORC coding of the ballots found that the most common problem with optical scanned ballots
involved people voting for a candidate, say Bush, and then writing in that candidates name in the columns
labeled \Write In." The machine tabulator failed to count these ballots, though voter intention was easily
resolved.
2See Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Projecct Report, no. 1 (2001) and Ansolabehere and Stewart
(2002) for further de¯nition and discussion of residual votes. Studies using similar measures include Knack
and Kropf (2001), whose results are consistent with the Caltech/MIT study, and Brady et al (2002), who
¯nd similar problems with punch cards but suggest somewhat better performance for electronic equipment.
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When there is a legal challenge to an election or a mandated recount, state or local election
o±ces conduct an audit of votes cast. For paper ballot systems, election o±cials reexamine
the ballots to determine voter intention. Tabulations may change from the initial count to
the recount for a variety of reasons: ballots may be mishandled; machines may have di±culty
reading markings; people and machines may make tabulation errors. Because recounts are
used to certify the vote, greater e®ort is taken to arrive at the most accurate accounting of
ballots cast. The initial count of ballots, then, is treated as a preliminary count, and the
recount as the o±cial count. The recount, then, validates the initial tabulation.
Recounts allow us to see more precisely whether the introduction of voting machines
has improved the tabulation of votes. Do machines have higher validation rates (and lower
invalidation rates) than hand-counts?
We examine data on recounts for New Hampshire towns. There are several important
reasons for studying New Hampshire. First, New Hampshire uses hand-counted paper ballots
extensively as well as optically scanned ballots. This allows us to contrast new and old meth-
ods of counting directly. Second, New Hampshire has a large number of elections. Because
recounts are rare, the high frequency of elections means that we have a large number of cases
to study. Third, New Hampshire has a uniform reporting system for recounts dating back
at least to the 1940s. The data on recounts are, then, comparable and the historical record
allows us to establish a solid baseline against which to contrast new tabulation methods.
Two caveats accompany the use of recounts to measure the validity of tabulations. First,
this measure only concerns tabulation. It ignores other factors, such as voter confusion about
how to mark a machine-readable ballot, which might lead people to vote accidentally twice
for an o±ce or not at all. Such phenomena are captured by residual votes.
The metric di®ers for paper ballot systems and elections in which votes are cast on lever
machines or electronic voting machines (also known as Direct Recording Electronincs, or
DREs). Mechanical and electronic voting machines do not retain a separate record of the
voters' intention, so it is impossible, at least with current technology, to compare voters'
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intentions with the machines' recordings. Recounts with mechanical and electronic voting
machines merely capture whether whether the election o±ce made a recording error or
whether the machine is functioning. With mechanical and electronic machines it is impossible
to gauge the degree of malfunction or the disparity between voter intentions and machine
recordings.
Historical Recounts
Historical recounts provide an important baseline. Over a long period of time across
many o±ces, we can examine the percent di®erence between initial counts and recounts.
We examine historical recount data in the state of New Hampshire from 1946 to 1962.
The ¯rst use of punch card machinery in the United States occurs in 1964. In the general
elections in this span, 108 races had recounts. The o±ces involved range from registrar of
voters to representative of Congress as well as town questions. The majority of the recounts
(69) occurred in races for state representative. All recounts are aggregated to the town level
except those for Congressional races and state senate races which were aggregated to district
levels.
These data provide complete and consistent information about the accuracy of hand
counted votes for 9 elections over sixteen years. Since all ballots during this time were hand
counted once in the initial count and again in the recount we are able to evaluate accuracy
rates of the counts independent of residual votes.
Our analysis consists of 415 cases where a case is a reported ballot tabulation of a town
or (district) for each candidate running in a race. We compute the invalidation rate for each
candidate for each o±ce in each jurisdiction. That is, we compute the percent di®erence
between the initial count and the recount for the votes recorded in each jurisdiction (i.e.,
town or ward) for each candidate seeking an o±ce.
Two di®erent average invalidation rates are of interest. First, the simple average invali-
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dation re°ects what happens in a typical jurisdiction. In a state with many small towns and
a handful of larger towns, the typical jurisdiction will be a small one. Second, the weighted
average, weighting by total ballots cast, equals the percent of ballots cast that di®ered be-
tween the counts. This measure guards against the occasional aberrant tabulation in a small
community. The weighted average measures the frequency with which one's vote is counted
in the initial count with each type of equipment. We will focus on the latter, but will report
both.
Historically, hand-counted paper tabulations have an invalidation rate just under 1 per-
cent. The weighted average of the discrepancy between the initial count and the recount is
approximately 0.83 percentage point with a 95% con¯dence interval from 0.61 to 1.05.
Hand-Counts vs. Machine-Counts
Fast forward to 2002. While most counties and towns continue to use hand-counted
paper, many of the towns in three counties had shifted to optically scanned paper ballots.
Two sorts of scanners were used: Election Systems and Software's Optech and Global's (now
Diebold's) Accuvote.3
Six races were recounted following the 2002 general election. Data on the recount are
reported at the town and sometimes ward level. Again, we distinguish between the average
percent di®erence and the percent of all ballots cast (regardless of size of jurisdiction).
Our analysis here considers the changes between the initial counts and recounts for each
method of vote tabulation. Again, we compute a weighted mean of the average absolute
percent di®erence between the initial count and the recount. We present the hand-counted
data with and without the town of Bradford, where the initial tabulations di®ered from the
recount by as much as 20 percent.
3Voting machinery of New Hampshire towns obtained from
http://www.nh.gov/sos/voting%20machines.htm
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Table 2
Tabulation Error Rates of Hand-Counted and Scan Ballots
New Hampshire 2002 General Election
N Weighted 95 % Con¯dence Maximum¤
Average Interval
Hand-Counted 92 2.49 (1.44, 3.55) 21.88
Hand-Counted 79 0.87 (0.69, 1.06) 4.08
(without Bradford)
Machine Counted 217 0.56 (0.42, 0.70) 8.27
OPTECH 21 0.55 (0.40, 0.70) 1.36
ACCUVOTE 196 0.56 (0.41, 0.71) 8.27
¤ The minimum value is 0 in all cases.
The results for hand-counted paper, excluding Bradford, are nearly identical to the his-
torical average. We take this as the baseline. The percentage di®erence for optically scanned
paper was .56 percent, approximately one half of one percent and signi¯cantly lower than
the hand-counted paper.
The di®erences in the table may owe to the type of equipment or the size of the commu-
nity. Smaller communities are more likely to have a large discrepancy in their tabulations
and they are more likely to use paper ballots.
We can untangle these e®ects by controlling for the o±ce at stake and the size of the
vote cast. We performed two regression analyses to estimate the e®ect of ScanBallot, which
equals 1 if the town used optically scanned ballots and 0 if the town used hand-counted
paper ballots. We control for total votes cast in a town and the initial count for a candidate.
We also control for the o±ce at stake, as some elections spanned several towns. This allows
us to hold constant the candidates on the ballot. Table 2 presents two analyses, one of which
removes the e®ect of o±ce (see column labeled Fixed E®ects) and one does not (see column
labeled OLS). We present both as a robustness check.
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Table 2
Estimated E®ect of Machine v. Hand Count
on Tabulation Error Rate, 2002
OLS Regression Fixed E®ects
For O±ce
b (S.E.) b (S.E.)
Constant .825 (.113) .800 (.113)
Scan Ballot -.450 (.170) -.523 (.171)
Town Vote .014 (.004) .012 (.004)
(in 1000's)
Candidate's Initial -.072 (.095) .063 (.106)
Vote (in 1000's)
R2 .05 .08
N 306 306
The key coe±cient of interest is the e®ect of ScanBallot: The coe±cient in both speci¯-
cations is approximately -.5, which means that the percentage di®erence between the initial
count and the recount is approximately one half of one-percentage point lower in towns using
scanners than in towns using hand-counted paper, holding constant the initial count, the
total vote, and the o±ce sought. These coe±cients are slightly larger than the observed
di®erence between the mean for hand-counted and machine counted (which is .87-.56 = .31).
To see the practical e®ect of these estimates consider an election with 10,000 votes where
the candidate in question received exactly half of the votes.4 The predicted discrepancy
between counts is 1.24 percent if the town tabulates by hand (i.e., :80+ :012£10+ :063£5 =
1:24) and .71 percent if the town uses an optical scanner (i.e., :80+:012£10+:063£5 = :712).
4We caution against making out of sample predictions. The largest community in 2002 was Manchester,
which recorded approximately 25,000 votes. The e®ect of town vote likely tends to an asymptote and the
linear speci¯ cation used cannot capture the predicted discrepancy for larger communities.
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Conclusions
Recounts provide information on the reliability of voting tabulation methods. In recounts
of paper ballots, election o±cials and judges make the best attempt to resolve voter inten-
tions. The discrepancy between the initial (and preliminary) count and the recount captures
the degree to which a tabulation method incorrectly tabulates the votes. Estimated valida-
tion rates from recounts supplements other metrics, especially residual votes. Residual votes
capture a wide variety of ways that voting systems fail to capture the voters' intentions, in-
cluding voter confusion and errors in marking ballots, mishaps in handling ballots, machine
failures, and tabulator errors.
As an example of how this information can be used to re¯ne our understanding of the
sources and causes of errors in voting consider what percent of the residual vote might be
tabulation error. We can calculate this using data on the residual vote in presidential rates in
New Hampshire from 1988 to 2000. In the counties and towns using only paper ballots, the
residual vote rate was 2.3 percent; in the towns using optical scanning, the residual vote rate
was 1.7 percent. Using the data on the validation rate from the historical record and from
the 2002 elections, the tabulation invalidation rate was .83 percent for paper and .56 percent
for optical scanning. Roughly one third of the residual vote, then, is pure tabulation error.
The remainder is either unrecoverable ballots (i.e., people who accidentally voted twice) or
blank ballots.
Stepping back from the details of the data, New Hampshire's recounts speak directly to
two important questions in election administration.
Have we made progress? Do machine counts improve on hand counts? At least in the
comparison of optical scanning and paper, the answer is yes. Historically, there is about
a 1 percent di®erence between initial counts and recounts when ballots are tabulated by
hand. The discrepancy between initial counts and recounts falls to about .5 percent with the
optically scanned ballots. Looking at recounts from 2002, controlling for total vote, initial
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vote, and o±ce sought, optically scanned paper produced a lower discrepancy between the
initial count and the recount compared to hand-counted paper.
Considering these tabulation errors, how con¯dent should we be in vote counts, and
when should we have a recount? The tabulation invalidation rate was low, especially for
optical scanning. However, it was not trivial. In a US House election with 250,000 votes,
the invalidation rate of .005 for scanners amounts to 1250 votes. The tabulation errors
may swing toward any of the contestants in a recount. Assuming a uniform distribution of
tabulation errors, any race decided by less than .5 percent of the vote will have a non-trivial
probability of being reversed in a recount.
Most states have no set standard for an automatic recount; the courts or state election
o±cer decides whether a recount is appropriate. Some states do have provisions for automatic
recounts { typically, if the election is closer than one-half of one percent of ballots cast
(National Commission on Federal Election Reform, 2002, pages 343-346). This standard is
approximately equal to the average tabulation error rate with optical scanning equipment,
but smaller than the rate for hand counted paper. The average, of course, re°ects the typical
case, so, for both optical scanning and hand counted paper, the discrepancy between initial
counts and recounts in many jurisdictions in our data exceeded the .5 percent standard.
State election o±cials and courts should treat an automatic recount standard of .5 percent
as a minimum threshold, rather than an absolute standard.
8
